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BRIAN BURKHART, DAVID J. CARLSON, BILLY J. STRATTON, THEODORE C. VAN 
ALST, CAROL EDELMAN WARRIOR 
 
The following began as a plenary roundtable at the Native American Literature Symposium at 
the Isleta Resort and Casino in Albuquerque, NM, on Thursday March 17, 2016. Participating 
were Theo (Ted) Van Alst (Uof Montana), Carol Edelman Warrior (Cornell University), Brian 
Burkhart (California State University, Northridge), Billy Stratton (Uof Denver) and David J. 
Carlson (California State University, San Bernardino). The material printed here consists of 
revised versions of the remarks made by the panelists at NALS, reflecting ongoing conversation 
that continued, over email, after the conference ended.  
 
VAN ALST:  It’s such an honor to be here, and to be assembled with these amazing scholars. 
I’d like to thank them all for being part of this panel.  
 
 The publication of Glen Sean Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial 
Politics of Recognition on New Year’s Day in 2014 (arriving little more than a year after the 
recognized beginning of the Idle No More movement) gave many scholars a longer than usual 
pause at the addition of another book that might fall into the growing canon/canyon of Native 
sovereignty approaches. However, the text itself provides a number of moments that question the 
legitimacy of settler states’ sovereignty, and we naturally apply that question of legitimacy and 
legitimation to Native literary production—who or what decides that “Native American 
Literature” is a genre, a subheading, a college course, an exceedingly small shelf or two in most 
bookstores?  
 This ultimately liberating text makes me see through the fallacy of colonial structures, 
and rage at the fact of their existence, while the colonial state’s recognition of my animosity only 
brings a smile to the face of the settler society that realizes far better than I that my undying 
enmity is necessary for its survival, my baleful recognition of them and theirs cementing their 
malignant place in the order of things. But that dance is the easiest one. 
 So then, how to extricate, expand, elude, or elide? Coulthard’s work makes plain the 
ephemeral nature of the colonial superstructure, and calls us to, in effect, change the base. How 
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do we do this via artistic production, for many of us then, via writing, and particularly for those 
of us who write in English?  
 Coulthard says, “At the heart of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic is the idea that both parties 
engaged in the struggle for recognition are dependent on the other’s acknowledgement for their 
freedom and self-worth. Moreover, Hegel asserts that this dependency is even more crucial for 
the master in the relationship, for unlike the slave he or she is unable to achieve independence 
and objective self-certainty through the object of his or her own labor.” (39) 
 The fact aside that without us, without this hemisphere, there is no modernity, only a 
backwater province of the Ottoman Empire, who are these arbiters of genre/label/consumption, 
and do we recognize their position when we write “Native Lit” and in “Native Studies” that we 
publish with “Native Pes” for distribution onto “Native Shelves” in “Native Sections” of libraries 
and the few remaining bookstores? Do we dispossess ourselves of artistic/literary sovereignty in 
acquiescing to the requirements of the publishing world? (Might it be useful to ask, “What if 
white people wrote books and no one read them?” What would they do? Do we do what they do? 
Should we / could we do what they do?)  
 Coulthard continues: “Fanon’s position challenges colonized peoples to transcend the 
fantasy that the settler-state apparatus—as a structure of domination predicated on our ongoing 
dispossession—is somehow capable of producing liberatory effects.” (23) One of those 
disingenuous liberatory effects is the belief that Indigenous empowerment via literary production 
is somehow a stage, a phase even—that leads to what? we ask. Grown up big boy/big girl status 
as Literature That Can Stand On Its Own Two Feet? Or that the Indigenous cultural worker can 
or should make the leap into a non-Native world and find fame and fortune? Coulthard addresses 
these questions in part, saying: “Indigenous peoples tend to view their resurgent practices of 
cultural self-recognition and empowerment as permanent features of our decolonial political 
projects, not transitional ones.” (23) 
 Here then, we move to apply constructions of “Nativeness” to literature, arguably one of 
our permanent features of decolonialism in the current realm. To be sure, Fanon’s discussion of 
“culture” encompasses much more than merely literature, but importantly for its producers, 
Coulthard tells us, “one of Fanon’s lingering concerns is that the cultural forms and traditions 
exuberantly reclaimed and affirmed by the colonized no longer reflect the dynamic systems that 
existed prior to the encounter: rather, ‘this culture, once living and open to the future, [has 
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become] closed, fixed in the colonial status.’” (147) Do we do this? Are we beholden to ready 
semiotic devices, to “corn pollen and feathers,” to relentless mentions of NDNess, of Native 
things, of cloddy authorial reminders that this is a story written by an Indian? Are there certain 
calcifying tropes that absolutely must be retained in the service of authenticity, of clear 
Indigenous literary demarcation? Coulthard answers, albeit from a more generalized position, 
saying: “The problem here is that the cultural practices that the colonized passionately cling to as 
a source of pride and empowerment can easily become a cluster of antiquated attachments that 
divert attention away from the present and future needs of the Indigenous population.” We turn 
then to a brief look at the function of this colonial recognition. 
 The discussion of Hegelian dialectics in this passage from the first chapter, “The Politics 
of Recognition in Colonial Contexts” is particularly germane to our colonial literary 
conversation:  
“Thus, rather than leading to a condition of reciprocity the dialectic either breaks 
down with the explicit nonrecognition of the equal status of the colonized 
population, or with the strategic “domestication” of the terms of recognition 
leaving the foundation of the colonial relationship undisturbed.” (40) 
And while literary domestication is our contemporary concern, I think (aptly enough) it is worth 
noting that “domestication” in all sorts of interpretations has underpinned almost every single 
colonial project concerning the Indigenous nations of this hemisphere from the moment of 
contact to, say, any meeting likely taking place right now between a Native student union and a 
college administrator somewhere in this country. 
To begin to close our discussion then, Coulthard tells us that by Chapter 4 of “Red Skins” 
the futility of “Hegelian or liberal politics of recognition” applied to colonial situations will be 
evident in its absence from Fanon’s discourse, though of whom he says while not rejecting 
outright either of those approaches, he did in fact work to focus our attention on “the host of self-
affirmative cultural practices that colonized peoples often critically engage in to empower 
themselves, as opposed to relying too heavily on the subjectifying apparatus of the state or other 
dominant institutions of power to do this for them (23).” And here, for literary, theoretical, and 
critical production, we name the museums, the Pes, the media, and the academy, among others, 
and I’m hopeful that the role of those institutions will be continuously questioned, starting this 
morning. Related to such, I have some questions: 
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 Have we been domesticated, has our written production been domesticated?  
 Despite our efforts, are our colonial foundations “relatively undisturbed?”  
 What might an absence of colonization have done to and for Native literary  
  production? Would Native literature have absorbed English?  
 What impact would Native writers have on global literature?  
 What might true sovereignty do for Native literary production?  
 How does Native literature offer insights into "reevaluating, reconstructing, and  
  redeploying Indigenous cultural forms" and presenting "radical  
  alternatives" to colonial domination? (48-49).  
 Finally, what are the book’s implications for U.S. tribal sovereignty, for policy, for  
  literary theory, for nation formation? 
 Does Native literature offer models of Indigenous praxis and present "radical  
  alternatives" to colonial domination? If so, how? 
I would like to end my segment with what I see as the beginning of our conversation, that 
of Coulthard’s main argument, which is: 
“the liberal recognition-based approach to Indigenous self-determination in 
Canada that began to consolidate itself after the demise of the 1969 White Paper 
(note*abolishment of The Indian Act) has not only failed, but now serves to reproduce 
the very forms of colonial power which our original demands for recognition sought to 
transcend. This argument will undoubtedly be controversial to many Indigenous scholars 
and Aboriginal organization leaders insofar as it suggest that much of our efforts over the 
last four decades to attain settler-state recognition of our rights to land and self-
government have in fact encouraged the opposite—the continued dispossession of our 
homelands and the ongoing usurpation of our self-determining authority.” (23-24) 
Where is our self-determining authority in our literary and artistic production, and what does it 
mean? Who defines it, and how?  
I look forward to everyone’s answers to these and other questions. 
 
CARLSON:  The particular topic that I wanted to throw into the mix for discussion is 
Coulthard’s engagement with Karl Marx. The Marxist concept that matters most to Coulthard in 
Red Skins, White Masks is that of primitive accumulation. In Marx’s usage, primitive 
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accumulation refers to the historical processes of violent dispossession whereby the “commons” 
possessed by non-capitalist producers are transformed and privatized in ways that facilitate the 
emergence of capitalist society. For Coulthard, the full utility of the concept in understanding 
and critiquing settler-colonial society can only be realized through its dialectical re-
interpretation. Marx’s insights must be revised in light of indigenous experience and critique. 
Doing so leads to abandoning certain problematic aspects of Marx’s theory. These would 
include: (1) the idea that primitive accumulation took place and ended in the historical past; (2) 
the idea that primitive accumulation is part of an inevitable evolution towards communism 
through industrial capitalism; and (3) the idea that primitive accumulation only takes place 
through overtly coercive means. Indigenizing “primitive accumulation” suggests, instead, that 
the co-optation of the commons (in the form of land, in particular) is an ongoing, and often more 
insidious process, one that should not be accepted as a historical inevitability. For Coulthard, this 
insight stands at the heart of the theory and practice of the Idle No More movement, among other 
examples of recent activism.  
 In picking up and re-purposing a key Marxist concept, it seems to me that Red Skin, 
White Masks productively re-starts a conversation about the relationship between indigenous 
epistemologies and the Marxist and Post-Marxist left, one that has been rather dormant for the 
last twenty or thirty years. The fact that Coulthard does so in a work that is so clearly critical of 
the dangers involved in superficial or overly conciliatory engagements with discourses emerging 
from settler-colonial societies is equally striking. As I read it, Red Skin, White Masks picks up a 
debate that largely dead-ended with Ward Churchill’s 1983 collection Marxism and Native 
Americans and tries to breathe new life into it. It does so by suggesting that a truly dialectical 
relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous “theory” can yield both new critical 
concepts and new forms of political praxis. Personally, I think this insight derives from the fact 
that (many) indigenous epistemologies are extremely dialectical, in ways, quite frankly, that 
western theories often only aspire to be (despite their pretensions). In my own work on Gerald 
Vizenor, I’ve regularly tried to suggest that what Vizenor calls “natural reason” is, in many 
respects, a form of dialectics that is arguably consistent with Marx’s methods of inquiry. Frank 
Black Elk’s contribution to Churchill’s volume, “Marxism and Lakota Tradition” makes a 
similar argument in picking up on the centrality of the concept of “relation” in both systems of 
thought.   
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 The first suggestion I’d like to throw out here, then, is that Coulthard’s book reminds 
readers of how far many of us in the field of Native Studies are from truly taking tribal 
epistemologies seriously as philosophical systems and sources of critical activity. While his 
explicit focus is on the concept of “primitive accumulation,” the deeper connection he points out 
between Marxist and indigenous thought is at the level of method. If we build on that insight, I 
think Red Skin, White Masks further suggests that western theory can itself be dialectically 
transformed when brought into contact with indigenous experiences and knowledge. We need to 
dispense with Bering Strait models of theoretical transmission, in other words. This was a point 
made thirty years ago by some of the contributors to Churchill’s book, and it is an insight that is 
relevant to all forms of theory, including literary theory. 
 This leads me to the second suggestion. As some of you may know, my own critical work 
tries to focus on the ways that literature intersects and interacts with politics and activism, and on 
the manner in which indigenous ways of thinking, writing, and telling represent meaningful 
forms of resistance to settler colonialism. As such, I am someone who feels a degree of sadness 
and anxiety as I watch the ways in which Native Studies recently seems to be turning its back on 
literature and literary studies in favor of the social sciences. Ask yourself what the big books in 
the field are in recent years. You are likely to call to mind titles like Red Skin, White Masks or 
Audra Simpson’s Mohawk Interruptus (innovative works of political science and anthropology). 
I don’t want to let the fact that I am part of a panel discussing the first of these at NALS suggest 
that I am throwing in the towel. What I would suggest instead is that there is great value for us, 
as literary scholars, in wrestling with a book like Red Skins, White Masks at the level of method. 
Read in that way, Coulthard’s book reminds us that Native literary study benefits from deep, 
sustained efforts to interrogate and transform its very language and methods. For all its flaws, I 
admire much of Craig Womack’s work for his efforts along these lines. To the extent that we 
here ARE doing that kind of work, we need to tell the story better, and encourage younger 
scholars in the field to experiment boldly. And to the extent that we aren’t satisfied with our 
efforts along these lines, we might, perhaps, try to take inspiration from the way Coulthard 
revisits and sublates an old concept from Marx to make new thought. I’m eager to see more and 
more of this transformative work coming out of NALS. I want to see us experiment more boldly 
with our own concepts—with ideas like symbolism, or the reader, or the book.  
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 Recently, I was considering some examples of the potential that can be released through 
the dialectical transformation of literary, legal, and political concepts. I’ll just mention a few 
here, as a vehicle for spurring further discussion. Consider, for example, how both Vine Deloria 
and John Mohawk, in different works, draw attention to the political power of reimagining what 
is meant by “The People.” Deloria develops this idea in terms of U.S. constitutionalism in We 
Talk, You Listen. Mohawk’s essays on the nature of Haudenosaunee political life (most readily 
accessible in the John Mohawk Reader) make interesting points about how the nature of political 
authority and the sense of how it is exercised is shaped by our sense of the relationship between 
individuals and the broader polity, mediated through the concept of peoplehood. There are 
further points of connection here with the work of Mark Rifkin and Kevin Bruyneel, all of 
which, taken together, reveal interesting ways that literature, storytelling, and political theory can 
come together. 
 For a second example of the importance of the dialectical transformation of concepts, we 
might consider a term like “claims” (I think this ties in with some of Carol’s thoughts. Maybe 
“resentment” is also a key element underlying dialectical change in the present moment?) In his 
recent book on the federal Indian claims process in the U.S., Hollow Justice, David Wilkins 
offers up an interesting definition of a claim. “A claim is neither a request, nor a demand,” he 
notes. “It is an appeal to a standard of justice, but also an assertion of willingness to back that 
appeal up with action.” That’s clearly not exactly the way the U.S. Court of Indian Claims has 
defined the term, of course, for there, it is more or less a form of tort (the payment of 
compensation). This, of course, calls to mind much of what Coulthard dislikes about the 
discourse of reconciliation in a Canadian context. Wilkins’ counter-definition represents an 
interesting and important provocation, though, in a spirit that I think Coulthard would appreciate. 
In places, Hollow Justice seems to call for the start of a dialectical transformation of the concept 
of the claim, a process that literature and literary study can certainly play a role in, in part at least 
by advancing different types of narratives that underpin “appeals to standards of justice.”  
 There are other examples I could throw out here. What about the concept of “reading” 
when that act is understood in dialogue with the oral tradition? Might Native Studies offer ways 
of thinking about text/reader that potentially transforms reader-response paradigms? What about 
figures like Gerald Vizenor, or N. Scott Momaday, or George Morrison, whose work suggests 
how indigenous writing, art, and theory can redefine modernism, and by extension “modernity,” 
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an important topic indeed for indigenous peoples who continue to be disadvantaged by the 
discourses of western temporality. I’ll stop here, though, with the hope that some of these points 
will strike others as worth picking up for further discussion.  
 
WARRIOR: My responses are to the chapter called “Seeing Red,” in which Coulthard writes 
about the relationship between the politics of recognition and the trend of nation states to offer 
official apologies to surviving victims of state violence and other systemic abuses. The goal is to 
elicit forgiveness from the survivors—ostensibly, to foster “healing” between the parties, so that 
the nation can “move forward,” and of course, moving forward in this case means to proceed to 
control a population, but with more willing subjects. It’s like an abusive spouse who, after 
knocking their partner around, says, “I’m sorry, honey, I’ll never do that again. Please forgive 
me.” What if the partner were to say “no”? The apology is accompanied by a demand, rather 
than a request. And, like an abused spouse, the colonized population is expected to acquiesce—
to forgive, and to forget—and they risk retaliation if they don’t comply. 
 Using the discourse of reconciliation, settler colonial states Pure Indigenous peoples to 
accept conciliatory overtures, but only on the states’ terms. These demands are underpinned by 
what Thomas Brudholm, writing on transitional justice, and quoted by Coulthard calls, the “logic 
of forgiveness”—which is the “normative assumption”— that forgiveness is “good,” and anger is 
not only “bad,” but is something that is sure to fester, preventing the wounds from healing (107). 
Of course, the roots of the “logic of forgiveness” are also familiar in everything from Christian 
dogma, to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, as Coulthard points out to both medical psychiatry 
and pop psychology. Individuals and collectives who won’t or can’t forgive are seen as being 
backward, reactive, and irrational—or, to trace it further, childlike and primitive (111). It’s the 
source of the judgmental comment that we’ve all heard, “Why can’t you people just get over it 
and move on?” 
 But Coulthard is an advocate of resentment as a necessary, transformative step toward 
decolonization. He differentiates resentment from anger, explaining that there are any number of 
things that a person or a people can be angry about, but resentment is a particular kind of anger 
that’s always political—that is, it is concerned with power, and is generated in response to a 
perceived injustice (110). 
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 Like Fanon, Coulthard thinks that resentment on the part of colonized people has a 
powerful “transformative potential,” that “can help prompt the very forms of self-affirmative 
praxis that generate rehabilitated Indigenous subjectivities and decolonized forms of life in ways 
that the combined politics of recognition and reconciliation has so far proven itself incapable of 
doing” (109). Though Coulthard doesn’t present a rosy picture of Indigenous resentment that is 
in any way immune from turning inward to self-hate and lateral violence—in fact, he explicitly 
warns that resentment can get stuck at this stage—he also demonstrates that resentment in 
response to injustice “represent[s]” a “coming-to-consciousness of the colonized,” allowing the 
colonized to exorcise internal colonization. He writes that resentment, then, is the externalization 
of that which was previously internalized: a purging,” of what the colonized had formerly 
accepted as “one’s own deficiencies” (114). 
So—what does this have to do with Native literature? Well, Coulthard is interested in the 
resurgence of Indigenous transformative praxis, and I would argue that Indigenous literary 
“traditions” play an important role in that process, first, because they depict ways to be in 
respectful place-based relationships, or, they depict the devastation that occurs when those 
relationships are disrespected. In an earlier chapter, Coulthard also explains that, “Indigenous 
struggles against capitalist imperialism are best understood as struggles oriented around the 
question of land—struggles not only for land, but also deeply informed by what the land as a 
mode of reciprocal relationships […] ought to teach us about living our lives in relation to one 
another and our surroundings in a respectful, nondominating and nonexploitative way. The 
ethical framework provided by these place-based practices and associated forms of knowledge is 
[called] ‘grounded normativity’ (60).”  
 Second, in many cases—from origin stories to contemporary Indigenous fiction—coming 
to a place of “grounded normativity” is something Indigenous storytellers have their characters 
perform, in something like an Indigenized bildungsroman. Such characters also go through 
transformations from colonized subjectivities to decolonized subjectivities. They pass through a 
phase of internal colonization, which then, through the movement of the plot, becomes 
externalized—and the resulting resentment that the character bears is, not always, but often 
enough, depicted as a righteous, slow-burning rage that’s prevented from being turned against 
the self through experience, and through training. Eventually, we see characters enact that thing 
that Coulthard refers to: place-based “grounded normativity.” These characters’ transformations 
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occasionally precede their participation in “direct action” against colonization. Reading a 
character’s transformation through resentment can actually be inspirational, opening up the 
readers’ conception of a possible self or possible selves as decolonized subjects.  
 Native literatures draw clear connections between settler colonial praxis and Indigenous 
suffering, and thus the literatures participate in consciousness-raising of Native readers. 
Indigenous readers experience an affective response when learning, through literature, that the 
subjection they (or we) experience isn’t limited to our own family or our own tribe. When 
learning through such literatures that the abuse is systemic and systematic, readers respond in 
ways that line up precisely with what Coulthard calls an “externalization of that which was 
previously internalized.” Most of us have experienced this process ourselves, and as I look out in 
this audience, I bet all of us repeatedly witness this same consciousness blossoming in our 
students as well.  
 In this way, Indigenous creative works inspire Indigenous readers and audiences to 
produce and sustain justifiable, and hopefully utilizable resentment against state- or settler- 
inflicted dispossession and colonial abuses, and such literature can thus prepare and arm people 
to resist narratives that Pure Indigenous peoples to forgive and reconcile before material change 
in the structures of colonial dominance is secured.  
After becoming conscious of this clear connection between Indigenous literature and the 
transformation Coulthard elucidates in “Seeing Red,” the question that I’m left grappling with, is 
how, exactly, does Native literature offer insights into “reevaluating, reconstructing, and 
redeploying Indigenous cultural forms,” and present “radical alternatives” to colonial domination 
without redeploying the romantic tropes of being “children of nature,” or, as Ted has said, 
without reminding the reader every twelve lines that “this is an Indian book” (48-49).  
 
BURKHART: The indigenous struggle for decolonial liberation has become increasingly a 
struggle for recognition by settler states, which of course ironically are the source of continued 
colonization. In Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition Coulthard 
argues that “the liberal recognition-based approach of Indigenous self-determination in Canada” 
not only fails but actually “serves to reproduce the very forms of colonial power which the 
original demands for recognition sought to transcend” (23-24). Coulthard conceptualizes the 
liberation from this vitiating circle of domination of colonial power through the politics of 
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recognition as beginning by bracketing the legitimacy of the settler state and its power to 
recognize Indigenous nations as itself a function of settler colonial power. Through this 
bracketing of the legitimacy of the settler state and settler state power, one can perhaps analyze 
the manner in which the settler state is able to reproduce the very colonial power that is supposed 
to be renegotiated in the process of recognizing the legitimacy of Indigenous nations. One might 
come to see how the process of recognition redirects Indigenous liberation strategies into 
movements that reproduce settler power rather than liberate Indigenous people from it. As 
Mohawk philosopher Taiaiake Alfred puts it, “our nations have been co-opted into movements of 
“self-government” and “land claim settlements,” which are goals defined by the colonial state 
and which are in stark opposition to our original objectives… Large-scale statist solutions like 
self-government and land claims are not so much lies as they are irrelevant to the root problems. 
For a long time now, we have been on a quest for governmental power and money; somewhere 
along the journey from the past to the future, we forgot that our goal was to reconnect with our 
lands and to preserve our harmonious cultures and ways of life” (2005, 31).    
 Coulthard also recognizes the origin of Indigenous liberation in the land. As he puts it, 
“[t]he theory and practice of Indigenous anticolonialism is best understood as a struggle 
primarily inspired by and oriented around the question of land—a struggle not only for land in 
the material sense, but also deeply informed by what the land as system of reciprocal relations 
and obligations can teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and the natural 
world in nondominating and nonexploitative terms” (13). Coulthard calls “this place-based 
foundation of Indigenous decolonial thought and practice grounded normativity,” or “the 
modalities of Indigenous land-connected practices and longstanding experiential knowledge that 
inform and structure our ethical engagements with the world and our relationships with human 
and nonhuman others over time” (13). This foundation of Indigenous liberation in the Indigenous 
meaning of land is transformed into a foundation of Indigenous liberation as a struggle for land 
itself, which is a conception of land fundamentally at odds with the Indigenous meaning of land 
that was at the foundation of Indigenous liberation in the first place. Thus by the end of 
Coulthard’s chapter on his own Indigenous nation’s (the Dene) struggle regarding land he shows 
that “the meaning of self-determination” for many Indigenous people has “reoriented from 
Indigenous struggle that was once deeply informed by the land as a system of reciprocal relations 
and obligations (grounded normativity) to a struggle now increasingly for land” (78). The 
Burkhart et al    “Red Pens, White Paper” 
 
 
 122 
problem with Coulthard’s position regarding the transformation of the foundation of Indigenous 
liberation in the Indigenous relationship with land into a struggle for land is that it only looks for 
the source of this transformation in the colonial power of the settler state itself. It is my claim 
that the nature of the transformation is not housed in the power of the settler state but in the very 
conceptions of land and being in the Western philosophical imagination. It is only through an 
engagement with the philosophical concepts of land and being that one can grasp the nature of 
Indigenous liberation through the land and the manner in which coloniality operates to transform 
that liberation into settler power. 
 Coulthard uses Fanon to challenge “colonized people to transcend the fantasy that the 
settler-state apparatus is somehow capable of producing liberatory effects” (23). In Fanon’s 
conception, without a break from the structure of colonial power, the best the colonized can hope 
for is “white liberty and white justice” (Black Skin, White Masks, 221). Fanon claims that 
without establishing themselves as the creators of their own values and conceptions of their 
identity and its political relationship to the colonial state, colonized peoples will eventually be 
subtly shaped by the “seep” of colonial values that will undermine the possibilities of their 
liberation (The Wretched of the Earth, 9). The problem is that the recognition-based subjectivity 
is founded in a fundamental irrationality in the first place. The “seep” of colonial values and 
concepts happens at the level of the very concept of being human, of being a human subject in 
the first place.  
 Enrique Dussel details in a number of his works the foundation of the modern human 
subject in the ego conquiro (I conquer) that is a prototype of the Cartesian ego cogito (I think). 
Descartes’ ego cogito appears as a mere rational principle that attempts to defeat skepticism 
regarding knowledge of the external world. But as Nelson Maldonado-Torres argues the ego 
cogito arises from the ego conquiro as responses to “Manichean misanthropic skepticism,” which 
“is not skeptical about the existence of the world or the normative status of logics and 
mathematics,” but is “a form of questioning the very humanity of colonized peoples” (2007, 
245). The ego conquiro and ego cogito overcome this skepticism of the humanity of the other 
through the creation of an ego that is undoubtable or unquestionable. The Manichean other to 
this undoubtable or unquestionable ego is relegated to the savage state. The savage other is no 
longer doubtable or questionable (as he or she is in the Inquisition) but is completely known as 
the dominated other. The domination of the savage other solidifies the claim to confidence that is 
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placed in the undoubtable and unquestionable ego. This domination is what brings the 
unquestionable ego into being. Its logical unquestionableness is manifested into an actual 
unquestionableness through the initial and continual domination of the savage other. It is through 
colonial domination that the ego of European humanness is fully actualized and the skepticism 
regarding the humanity of the Indigenous other is fully determined in the oppositional savage or 
non-human, dominatable other.   
 The irrationality of the Indigenous being becoming recognized as fully human is here 
exposed. The ego of European humanness exists only in relation to the non-human other. Thus, 
Indigenous being can only become human by becoming what it is not: European. Alternatively, 
Indigenous being can become an approximation of what it is not through the approximation of 
European being by approximating the ego conquiro. This is why even though Hegel’s 
recognition-based subjectivity seeks to situate human subjectivity, in contrast to the seemingly 
solipsistic ego cogito, in relations of recognition that are constitutive of human subjectivity, the 
ego conquiro is maintained in recognition-based subjectivity and politics of recognition. 
Dialectically the colonizer/colonized relationship is supposed to move beyond the ego conquiro 
through mutual relations of recognition. Relations of recognition must move beyond the master 
and slave, “beyond the patterns of domination” (Williams, 16), a seemingly impossible task even 
in concept. Hegel’s dominating subjectivity cannot move beyond this domination in relation to 
the savage other, I would argue. The savage other has become essentially savage and so can only 
become the kind of subjectivity that can recognize the colonizer in so far as he or she becomes 
something she is not. The only way the savage can hope to even approximate the kind of being 
that could give the colonizer the mutual recognition that Hegel claims he or she desires is to 
approximate the subjectivity of the colonizer, the ego conquiro.  
 Fanon sees the trap of the master/slave or colonizer/colonized through a lens of struggle. 
The liberation of colonized people through Hegel’s dialectical progression to mutual recognition 
is undermined by the lack of struggle in present colonial contexts. Unlike Hegel’s master/slave 
story, colonizer and colonized are not locked in a life or death struggle. In colonized societies, 
“the White Master, without conflict, recognize[s] the Negro slave” (Fanon, 1952, 217). “The 
black man,” he writes is “acted upon.” Values “not created by his actions” or “born of the 
systolic tide of his blood” are thrown upon him from without. Thus being set free by the master 
here means nothing to the slave. The slave goes “from one way of life to another, but not from 
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one life to another” (220). For Fanon, it is through struggle and conflict, which he understands as 
often necessarily violent, that colonized peoples can shrug off the coloniality of their being. This 
kind of conflict is necessary on Fanon’s account in order for recognition to achieve self-
transformation for the colonized subject, for her to achieve the “inner differentiation” at the level 
of her colonized being that is necessary to achieve the realization of freedom (Turner, 146). This 
is what Fanon understands as the break that is necessary for colonial struggles for “Liberty and 
Justice” to not merely be struggles for “white liberty and white justice,” a non-alienated 
identification with the recognition conferred upon the slave by the master (Fanon, 1952, 221) 
 Coulthard rightly questions Fanon’s instrumental view of the decolonial struggle. 
Coulthard points out that this view of colonial resistance does not match the views and practices 
of Indigenous people in their decolonial liberation strategies, particularly in the context of First 
Nations in Canada. Fanon does not see a deeper Indigenous resistance that already exists in the 
Indigenous relationship to land. Fanon thinks struggle is necessary for the colonized to 
differentiate, to begin to become aware of the deepest manners in which his being is colonized. 
But from the perspective of Indigeneity and its ontological connection to land, Fanon’s claim is 
not true. What creates the alienation from the coloniality of being that is necessary to manifest 
true acts of decolonial resistance is our ontological kinship, as Indigenous people, with the land. 
In this way, our being is never colonized to the point at which we do not experience the 
alienation of coloniality that Fanon thinks often requires a life or death struggle with the 
colonizer to achieve. No matter how powerful the colonial operation on human subjectivity 
through the ego conquiro, there is always a remainder of our Indigenous being that quite literally 
is in the land. Being is itself, in the context of Indigeneity, an orginary and continual 
manifestation out of the land. It is thus this core of our being as Indigenous people that originates 
out of and continues to exist in the land, that provides the differentiation necessary to begin 
decolonial resistance—and not, as Fanon says, the struggle itself. Because of this lack of 
understanding of the intersection of Indigeneity and land that both creates the capacity of 
coloniality in the first place and means that colonialism will necessarily always be incomplete, 
Fanon cannot see the scope of the possibilities of decolonial resistance that can exist outside and 
transcend the vitiation circle of human subjectivity, the politics of recognition, and the life or 
death struggle between the colonizer and the colonized. 
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STRATTON: Glen Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks serves as an especially prescient 
elaboration of the concern that Louis Owens expressed in his essay “As if an Indian Were Really 
an Indian: Native Voices and Postcolonial Theory” (adapted from a chapter of the same name in 
his 2001 book I Hear the Train: Reflections, Inventions, Refractions), which appears in Gretchen 
Bataille’s edited collection, Native American Representations: First Encounters, Distorted 
Images, and Literary Appropriations. Writing on the inherent challenges of being a scholar or 
teacher whose work focuses on native American literature he states: 
We are very properly expected to have and exhibit a crucial knowledge of canonical 
European and Euro-American literature; if we fail to be familiar with Shakespeare, 
Chaucer, Proust, Flaubert, Dickinson, Faulkner, Eliot, Joyce, Pound, Yeats, Keats, 
Woolf, Tolstoy, Tennyson, and so forth—not to mention the latest poststructuralist 
theory—we are simply not taken seriously and probably will not earn a degree in the first 
place. That, it is presumed, is the foundational knowledge, the ‘‘grand narrative of 
legitimation’’ in our particular field. (12) 
Red Skins, White Masks is a work that not only addresses the theory and praxis of decolonization 
and postcolonial theory, but also articulates a critical stance that is self-reflexively positioned as 
an intervention that grapples with the dynamic valences that exist between global indigenous 
studies and continental philosophy.  
 In chapter one, for example, Coulthard interrogates Charles Taylor’s widely influential 
essay “The Politics of Recognition,” published in Amy Gutman’s edited volume, 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (1995). Coulthard utilizes a 
deconstructive approach in his analysis to show that Taylor’s conception of identity formation is 
“shaped not only by recognition, but also its absence, often by the misrecognition of others” 
(30). One of Coulthard’s primary concerns extends from the observation that structures of 
explicit colonial domination cannot be eliminated through the vehicle of “state recognition and 
accommodation,” and are, in fact only transformed in the process (32). This insight is offered as 
the provocation for his challenge to oppressive epistemologies that function to reduce “a man 
among men” to “an object [among] other objects” (32). 
 While this critique is deeply informed by indigenous knowledge, giving substance to 
Coulthard’s commitment to the praxis of First Nations/native sovereignty his broader claims are 
bolstered by support drawn from the work of Taiaiake Alfred. In Alfred’s Peace, Power, 
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Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (1999), self-determination is conceived as the “asset of 
values that challenges the homogenizing force of Western liberalism and free-market 
capitalism,” while “honor[ing] the autonomy of individual conscience, non-coercive authority, 
and the deep interconnection between human beings and other elements of creation” (quoted in 
Coulthard).  
 Seeking to address the resistance to such ideas on a wide plane of political, social, and 
philosophical fronts, Coulthard also explores the work of continental philosophers and cultural 
critics such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Louis 
Althusser while drawing on Franz Fanon’s critique of “psycho-affective attachments” to 
“master-sanctioned forms of recognition” to help formulate an essential foundation for his ideas 
(26).  
 For Coulthard’s more sophisticated readers, especially those working within the fields of 
Native American/Indigenous studies, this philosophically engaged approach raises some 
complex questions about the relationship between indigenous knowledge and western 
knowledge, as well as the relevance and applicability of the latter for native/indigenous scholars, 
activists and communities. Representing a provocative incursion into these discursive fields it 
seems that Coulthard’s deep and sustained engagement with such discourse, which is both 
transhistoric and transcultural, could, perhaps, be seen as the philosophical equivalent of what 
Gloria Bird and Joy Harjo have termed “reinventing the enemy’s language.”  
 Furthermore, Coulthard’s text can also be seen as a call for the unification of anti-
colonial and de-colonial knowledge in the form of classic Marxist theory, as well as neo-Marxist 
and structuralist orientations that have tended to be overlooked, or under-utilized in 
native/indigenous studies as it has thus far been formulated and applied. The reliance upon these 
Western forms of knowledge by critics such as Taylor, Nancy Fraser, and others, demands 
Coulthard’s engagement and offers a particularly fertile opportunity to return them to their 
origins, as it were. 
 In terms of postcolonial theory, Coulthard likewise extends the critiques offered by other 
native/indigenous and indigenous studies scholars such as Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, Louis Owens, 
Jodi Bryd, Chadwick Allen, and Dale Turner who have addressed the long history and after-
effects of colonialism in ways that have inexplicably escaped the notice of critics such as Edward 
Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak, while being conspicuously overlooked in Ashcroft, 
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Griffiths and Tiffin’s seminal postcolonial text The Empire Writes Back (1989). 
 Louis Owens was among the first native American critics to address the perplexing 
absence of native/indigenous historical experience and literary perspectives from the growing 
body of postcolonial theory. Returning again to his observations on the absence of native 
perspectives in this discourse, Owens provocatively states: “It is difficult to take seriously any 
cultural or critical theorist who is ignorant of this rapidly growing body of work, or who, if he or 
she is aware of it, clearly relegates it to a ‘minor,’ ‘subjugated,’ or ‘deterritorialized’ knowledge 
worthy of only silence or erasure” (13-14). As a rejoinder to this, Coulthard reminds us that 
“colonial powers will only recognize the collective rights and identities of Indigenous peoples 
insofar as this recognition does not throw into question the background legal, political, and 
economic framework of the colonial relationship itself” (Red Skins 41). 
  These points of contact, of course, offer particularly fruitful avenues for the consideration 
of native storytelling/literature as an essential domain for the manifestation of collective self-
recognition through “the establishment of relationships within and between peoples and the 
natural world built on principles of reciprocity and respectful coexistence” (Red Skins 48). 
Works such as Gerald Vizenor’s Blue Ravens, Gordon Henry’s The Light People, Franci 
Washburn’s Elsie’s Business, as well as the poetry of Luci Tapahonso, as typified by her work, 
“That American Flag” and “In 1864,” and many others, bespeak the capacity of native writers 
and scholars to reflect on the postcolonial experience in significant ways. At the same time, such 
work highlights the foundational role that native American/First Nation and indigenous 
storytelling, in all of its previous and modern forms, plays in the continuation of such discourse. 
 
Works Cited 
 
Alfred, Taiaike. Peace, Power, and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto. Oxford UP, 2009. 
----. Wasase: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom. Toronto: Broadview P. 2005. 
Bataille, Gretchen, ed. Native American Representations: First Encounters, Distorted Images, 
and Literary Appropriations. U of Nebraska P, 2001.   
Churchill, Ward, ed. Marxism and Native Americans. South End Press, 1983. 
Coulthard, Glen. Red Skins, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. U of 
Minnesota P, 2014.
Burkhart et al    “Red Pens, White Paper” 
 
 
 128 
Deloria, Vine. We Talk, You Listen: New Tribes, New Turf. U of Nebraska P, 2007. 
Dussel, Enrique. “Anti-Cartesian Meditations: On the Origin of the Philosophical Anti-Discourse 
of Modernity.” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge, vol. 11, 
no. 1, 2013, pp. 1-40. 
----. “Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism”. Nepantla: Views from South, vol. 1, no. 3, 2000, 
pp. 465-478. 
Frantz Fanon. Black Skin, White Masks. Trans. R. Philcox. Grove Press, 1952. 
----. The Wretched of the Earth. Trans. R. Philcox. Grove Press, 1963.  
Hegel, G. W. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. Miller. Oxford UP. 1977. 
Maldonado-Torres, Nelson. Maldonado-Torres, Nelson.“On the Coloniality of Being.” Cultural 
Studies, vol. 22, no.2, 2007, pp. 240-270. 
Mohawk, John. Thinking in Indian: A John Mohawk Reader. Ed. José Barreiro. Fulcrum 
Publishing, 2010. 
Simpson, Audra. Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States. Duke 
UP, 2014.   
Turner, Lou. "On the Difference between the Hegelian and Fanonion Dialectic of Lordship and 
Bondage." In Fanon: A Critical Reader, edited by Lewis R. Gordan, T. Denean Sharpley-
Whiting and Renee T. White, Blackwell, 1996, pp. 134-51. 
Wilkins, David. Hollow Justice: A History of Indigenous Claims in the United States. Yale UP, 
2013.   
Williams, Robert. “Hegel and Nietzsche: Recognition and Master/Slave.” Philosophy Today, vol. 
45, no. 5, 2001, pp. 164-179. 
